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PROBLEMS IN GROUP THEORY MOTIVATED BY CRYPTOGRAPHY
VLADIMIR SHPILRAIN
ABSTRACT. This is a survey of algorithmic problems in group theory, old and new, moti-
vated by applications to cryptography.
1. INTRODUCTION
The object of this survey is to showcase algorithmic problems in group theory motivated
by (public key) cryptography.
In the core of most public key cryptographic primitives there is an alleged practical irre-
versibility of some process, usually referred to as a one-way function with trapdoor, which
is a function that is easy to compute in one direction, yet believed to be difficult to compute
the inverse function on “most” inputs without special information, called the “trapdoor”. For
example, the RSA cryptosystem uses the fact that, while it is not hard to compute the prod-
uct of two large primes, to factor a very large integer into its prime factors appears to be
computationally hard. Another, perhaps even more intuitively obvious, example is that of
the function f (x) = x2. It is rather easy to compute in many reasonable (semi)groups, but
the inverse function
√
x is much less friendly. This fact is exploited in Rabin’s cryptosystem,
with the multiplicative semigroup of Zn (n composite) as the platform. In both cases though,
it is not immediately clear what the trapdoor is. This is typically the most nontrivial part of a
cryptographic scheme.
For a rigorous definition of a one-way function we refer the reader to [71]; here we just
say that there should be an efficient (which usually means polynomial-time with respect
to the complexity of an input) way to compute this function, but no visible (probabilistic)
polynomial-time algorithm for computing the inverse function on “most” inputs.
Before we get to the main subject of this survey, namely problems in combinatorial
and computational group theory motivated by cryptography, we recall historically the first
public-key cryptographic scheme, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, to put things
in perspective. This is done in Section 2. We note that the platform group for the origi-
nal Diffie-Hellman protocol was finite cyclic. In Section 2.1, we show how to convert the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to an encryption scheme, known as the ElGamal cryp-
tosystem.
In the subsequent sections, we showcase various problems about infinite non-abelian
groups. Complexity of these problems in particular groups has been used in various cryp-
tographic primitives proposed over the last 20 years or so. We mention up front that a signif-
icant shift in paradigm motivated by research in cryptography was moving to search versions
of decision problems that had been traditionally considered in combinatorial group theory,
see e.g. [45, 60]. In some cases, decision problems were used in cryptographic primitives
(see e.g. [48]) but these occasions are quite rare.
Research of the author was partially supported by the ONR (Office of Naval Research) grant N000141512164.
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The idea of using the complexity of infinite non-abelian groups in cryptography goes back
toWagner and Magyarik [31] who in 1985 devised a public-key protocol based on the unsolv-
ability of the word problem for finitely presented groups (or so they thought). Their protocol
now looks somewhat naive, but it was pioneering. More recently, there has been an increased
interest in applications of non-abelian group theory to cryptography initially prompted by the
papers [1, 26, 68].
We note that a separate question of interest that is outside of the scope of this survey is
what groups can be used as platforms for cryptographic protocols. We refer the reader to
the monographs [44], [45], [15] for relevant discussions and examples; here we just mention
that finding a suitable platform (semi)group for one or another cryptographic primitive is
a challenging problem. This is currently an active area of research; here we can mention
that groups that have been considered in this context include braid groups (more generally,
Artin groups), Thompson’s group, Grigorchuk’s group, small cancellation groups, polycyclic
groups, (free) metabelian groups, various groups of matrices, semidirect products, etc.
Here is the list of algorithmic problems that we discuss in this survey. In most cases,
we consider search versions of the problems as more relevant to cryptography, but there are
notable exceptions.
– The word (decision) problem: Section 5
– The conjugacy problem: Section 3
– The twisted conjugacy problem: Section 3.2
– The decomposition problem: Section 4
– The subgroup intersection problem: Section 4.2
– The factorization problem: Section 4.4
– The isomorphism inversion problem: Section 6
– The subset sum and the knapsack problems: Section 8
– The Post correspondence problem: Section 9
– The hidden subgroup problem: Section 10
Also, in Section 7 we show that using semidirect products of (semi)groups as platforms for
a Diffie-Hellman-like key exchange protocol yields various peculiar computational assump-
tions and, accordingly, peculiar search problems.
In the concluding Section 11, we describe relations between some of the problems dis-
cussed in this survey.
2. THE DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
The whole area of public-key cryptography started with the seminal paper by Diffie and
Hellman [7]. We quote from Wikipedia: “Diffie-Hellman key agreement was invented in
1976 . . . and was the first practical method for establishing a shared secret over an unprotected
communications channel.” In 2002 [21], Martin Hellman gave credit to Merkle as well: “The
system . . . has since become known as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. While that system was
first described in a paper by Diffie and me, it is a public-key distribution system, a concept
developed by Merkle, and hence should be called ‘Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange’ if
names are to be associated with it. I hope this small pulpit might help in that endeavor to
recognize Merkle’s equal contribution to the invention of public-key cryptography.”
U. S. Patent 4,200,770, now expired, describes the algorithm, and credits Diffie, Hellman,
and Merkle as inventors.
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The simplest, and original, implementation of the protocol uses the multiplicative group Z∗p
of integers modulo p, where p is prime and g is primitive mod p. A more general description
of the protocol uses an arbitrary finite cyclic group.
(1) Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group G and a generating element g in G. We
will write the group G multiplicatively.
(2) Alice picks a random natural number a and sends ga to Bob.
(3) Bob picks a random natural number b and sends gb to Alice.
(4) Alice computes KA = (g
b)a = gba.
(5) Bob computes KB = (g
a)b = gab.
Since ab = ba (because Z is commutative), both Alice and Bob are now in possession of
the same group element K = KA = KB which can serve as the shared secret key.
The protocol is considered secure against eavesdroppers if G and g are chosen properly.
The eavesdropper, Eve, must solve the Diffie-Hellman problem (recover gab from ga and gb)
to obtain the shared secret key. This is currently considered difficult for a “good” choice of
parameters (see e.g. [32] for details).
An efficient algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem (i.e., recovering a from
g and ga) would obviously solve the Diffie-Hellman problem, making this and many other
public-key cryptosystems insecure. However, it is not known whether or not the discrete
logarithm problem is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem.
We note that there is a “brute force” method for solving the discrete logarithm problem:
the eavesdropper Eve can just go over natural numbers n from 1 up one at a time, compute
gn and see whether she has a match with the transmitted element. This will require O(|g|)
multiplications, where |g| is the order of g. Since in practical implementations |g| is typically
at least 10300, this method is considered computationally infeasible.
This raises a question of computational efficiency for legitimate parties: on the surface,
it looks like legitimate parties, too, have to perform O(|g|) multiplications to compute ga or
gb. However, there is a faster way to compute ga for a particular a by using the “square-and-
multiply” algorithm, based on the binary form of a. For example, g22 =(((g2)2)2)2 ·(g2)2 ·g2.
Thus, to compute ga, one actually needs O(log2 a)multiplications, which is feasible given the
magnitude of a.
2.1. The ElGamal cryptosystem. The ElGamal cryptosystem [9] is a public-key cryptosys-
tem which is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The ElGamal protocol is used in
the free GNU Privacy Guard software, recent versions of PGP, and other cryptosystems. The
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme, which
should not be confused with the ElGamal encryption protocol that we describe below.
(1) Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group G and a generating element g in G.
(2) Alice (the receiver) picks a random natural number a and publishes c= ga.
(3) Bob (the sender), who wants to send a message m ∈ G (called a “plaintext” in cryp-
tographic lingo) to Alice, picks a random natural number b and sends two elements,
m · cb and gb, to Alice. Note that cb = gab.
(4) Alice recovers m= (m · cb) · ((gb)a)−1.
A notable feature of the ElGamal encryption is that it is probabilistic, meaning that a single
plaintext can be encrypted to many possible ciphertexts.
We also point out that the ElGamal encryption has an average expansion factor of 2, mean-
ing that the ciphertext is about twice as large as the corresponding plaintext.
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3. THE CONJUGACY PROBLEM
Let G be a group with solvable word problem. For w,a ∈ G, the notation wa stands for
a−1wa. Recall that the conjugacy problem (or conjugacy decision problem) for G is: given
two elements u,v ∈G, find out whether there is x ∈G such that ux = v. On the other hand, the
conjugacy search problem (sometimes also called the conjugacy witness problem) is: given
two elements a,b ∈ G and the information that ux = v for some x ∈ G, find at least one
particular element x like that.
The conjugacy decision problem is of great interest in group theory. In contrast, the conju-
gacy search problem is of interest in complexity theory, but of little interest in group theory.
Indeed, if you know that u is conjugate to v, you can just go over words of the form ux and
compare them to v one at a time, until you get a match. (We implicitly use here an ob-
vious fact that a group with solvable conjugacy problem also has solvable word problem.)
This straightforward algorithm is at least exponential-time in the length of v, and therefore is
considered infeasible for practical purposes.
Thus, if no other algorithm is known for the conjugacy search problem in a group G, it is
not unreasonable to claim that x→ ux is a one-way function and try to build a (public-key)
cryptographic protocol on that. In other words, the assumption here would be that in some
groups G, the following problem is computationally hard: given two elements a,b of G and
the information that ax = b for some x ∈ G, find at least one particular element x like that.
The (alleged) computational hardness of this problem in some particular groups (namely, in
braid groups) has been used in several group based cryptosystems, most notably in [1] and
[26]. However, after some initial excitement (which has even resulted in naming a new area
of “braid group cryptography”, see e.g. [6]), it seems now that the conjugacy search problem
in a braid group may not provide sufficient level of security; see e.g. [22, 42, 43] for various
attacks.
We start with a simple key exchange protocol, due to Ko, Lee et al. [26], which is modeled
on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, see Section 2.
(1) An element w ∈ G is published.
(2) Alice picks a private a ∈ G and sends wa to Bob.
(3) Bob picks a private b ∈ G and sends wb to Alice.
(4) Alice computes KA = (w
b)a = wba, and Bob computes KB = (w
a)b = wab.
If a and b are chosen from a pool of commuting elements of the group G, then ab = ba,
and therefore, Alice and Bob get a common private key KB = w
ab = wba = KA. Typically,
there are two public subgroups A and B of the group G, given by their (finite) generating sets,
such that ab = ba for any a ∈ A, b ∈ B.
In the paper [26], the platform group G was the braid group Bn which has some natural
commuting subgroups. Selecting a suitable platform group for the above protocol is a very
nontrivial matter; some requirements on such a group were put forward in [58]:
(P0) The conjugacy (search) problem in the platform group either has to be well studied
or can be reduced to a well-known problem (perhaps, in some other area of mathe-
matics).
(P1) The word problem in G should have a fast (at most quadratic-time) solution by a de-
terministic algorithm. Better yet, there should be an efficiently computable “normal
form” for elements of G.
This is required for an efficient common key extraction by legitimate parties in a
key establishment protocol, or for the verification step in an authentication protocol,
etc.
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(P2) The conjugacy search problem should not have an efficient solution by a deterministic
algorithm.
We point out here that proving a group to have (P2) should be extremely difficult,
if not impossible. The property (P2) should therefore be considered in conjunction
with (P0), i.e., the only realistic evidence of a group G having the property (P2) can
be the fact that sufficiently many people have been studying the conjugacy (search)
problem in G over a sufficiently long time.
The next property is somewhat informal, but it is of great importance for practical
implementations:
(P3) There should be a way to disguise elements of G so that it would be impossible to
recover x from x−1wx just by inspection.
One way to achieve this is to have a normal form for elements of G, which usually
means that there is an algorithm that transforms any input uin, which is a word in the
generators of G, to an output uout , which is another word in the generators of G, such
that uin = uout in the group G, but this is hard to detect by inspection.
In the absence of a normal form, say if G is just given by means of generators and
relators without any additional information about properties of G, then at least some
of these relators should be very short to be used in a disguising procedure.
To this one can add that the platform group should not have a linear representation of a
small dimension since otherwise, a linear algebra attack might be feasible.
3.1. The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange protocol. In this section, we are going
to describe a key establishment protocol from [1] that really stands out because, unlike other
protocols based on the (alleged) hardness of the conjugacy search problem, it does not employ
any commuting or commutative subgroups of a given platform group and can, in fact, use any
non-abelian group with efficiently solvable word problem as the platform. This really makes
a difference and gives a big advantage to the protocol of [1] over most protocols in this and
the following section. The choice of the platform groupG for this protocol is a delicate matter
though. In the original paper [1], a braid group was suggested as the platform, but with this
platform the protocol was subsequently attacked in several different ways, see e.g. [3], [13],
[14], [22], [28], [29], [42], [43], [72]. The search for a good platform group for this protocol
still continues.
Now we give a description of the AAG protocol. A group G and elements
a1, ...,ak,b1, ...,bm ∈ G are public.
(1) Alice picks a private x ∈ G as a word in a1, ...,ak (i.e., x = x(a1, ...,ak)) and sends
bx1, ...,b
x
m to Bob.
(2) Bob picks a private y ∈ G as a word in b1, ...,bm and sends ay1, ...,ayk to Alice.
(3) Alice computes x(ay1, ...,a
y
k) = x
y = y−1xy, and Bob computes
y(bx1, ...,b
x
m) = y
x = x−1yx. Alice and Bob then come up with a common private key
K = x−1y−1xy (called the Commutator commutator of x and y) as follows: Alice
multiplies y−1xy by x−1 on the left, while Bob multiplies x−1yx by y−1 on the left,
and then takes the inverse of the whole thing: (y−1x−1yx)−1 = x−1y−1xy.
It may seem that solving the (simultaneous) conjugacy search problem for
bx1, ...,b
x
m;a
y
1, ...,a
y
k in the group G would allow an adversary to get the secret key K. How-
ever, if we look at Step (3) of the protocol, we see that the adversary would have to know
either x or y not simply as a word in the generators of the group G, but as a word in a1, ...,ak
(respectively, as a word in b1, ...,bm); otherwise, he would not be able to compose, say, x
y
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out of a
y
1, ...,a
y
k. That means the adversary would also have to solve the membership search
problem:
Given elements x,a1, ...,ak of a group G, find an expression (if it exists) of x
as a word in a1, ...,ak.
We note that the membership decision problem is to determine whether or not a given
x ∈ G belongs to the subgroup of G generated by given a1, ...,ak . This problem turns out
to be quite hard in many groups. For instance, the membership decision problem in a braid
group Bn is algorithmically unsolvable if n≥ 6 because such a braid group contains subgroups
isomorphic to F2×F2 (that would be, for example, the subgroup generated by σ21,σ22,σ24, and
σ25, see [5]), where F2 is the free group of rank 2. In the group F2×F2, the membership
decision problem is algorithmically unsolvable by an old result of Mihailova [34].
We also note that if the adversary finds, say, some x′ ∈ G such that bx1 = bx
′
1 , ...,b
x
m = b
x′
m,
there is no guarantee that x′ = x in G. Indeed, if x′ = cbx, where cbbi = bicb for all i (in
which case we say that cb centralizes bi), then b
x
i = b
x′
i for all i, and therefore b
x = bx
′
for any
element b from the subgroup generated by b1, ...,bm; in particular, y
x = yx
′
. Now the problem
is that if x′ (and, similarly, y′) does not belong to the subgroup A generated by a1, ...,ak
(respectively, to the subgroup B generated by b1, ...,bm), then the adversary may not obtain
the correct common secret key K. On the other hand, if x′ (and, similarly, y′) does belong to
the subgroup A (respectively, to the subgroup B), then the adversary will be able to get the
correct K even though his x′ and y′ may be different from x and y, respectively. Indeed, if
x′ = cbx, y′ = cay, where cb centralizes B and ca centralizes A (elementwise), then
(x′)−1(y′)−1x′y′ = (cbx)−1(cay)−1cbxcay= x−1c−1b y
−1c−1a cbxcay= x
−1y−1xy = K
because cb commutes with y and with ca (note that ca belongs to the subgroup B, which
follows from the assumption y′ = cay ∈ B, and, similarly, cb belongs to A), and ca commutes
with x.
We emphasize that the adversary ends up with the corrrect key K (i.e., K =
(x′)−1(y′)−1x′y′ = x−1y−1xy) if and only if cb commutes with ca. The only visible way to
ensure this is to have x′ ∈ A and y′ ∈ B. Without verifying at least one of these inclusions,
there seems to be no way for the adversary to make sure that he got the correct key.
Therefore, it appears that if the adversary chooses to solve the conjugacy search problem
in the group G to recover x and y, he will then have to face either the membership search
problem or the membership decision problem; the latter may very well be algorithmically
unsolvable in a given group. The bottom line is that the adversary should actually be solving
a (probably) more difficult (“subgroup-restricted”) version of the conjugacy search problem:
Given a group G, a subgroup A ≤ G, and two elements g,h ∈ G, find x ∈ A
such that h= x−1gx, given that at least one such x exists.
3.2. The twisted conjugacy problem. Let φ,ψ be two fixed automorphisms (more gener-
ally, endomorphisms) of a group G. Two elements u,v ∈ G are called (φ,ψ)-double-twisted
conjugate if there is an element w ∈ G such that uwφ = wψv. When ψ = id, then u and v are
called φ-twisted conjugate, while in the case φ = ψ = id, u and v are just usual conjugates of
each other.
The twisted (or double twisted) conjugacy problem in G is:
decide whether or not two given elements u,v ∈ G are twisted (double
twisted) conjugate in G for a fixed pair of endomorphisms φ,ψ of the group
G.
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Note that if ψ is an automorphism, then (φ,ψ)-double-twisted conjugacy problem reduces
to φψ−1-twisted conjugacy problem, so in this case it is sufficient to consider just the twisted
conjugacy problem. This problem was studied from group-theoretic perspective, see e.g.
[73, 53, 11], and in [64] it was used in an authentication protocol. It is interesting that the
research in [73, 53] was probably motivated by cryptographic applications, while the authors
of [11] arrived at the twisted conjugacy problem motivated by problems in topology.
4. THE DECOMPOSITION PROBLEM
Another ramification of the conjugacy search problem is the following decomposition
search problem:
Given two elements w and w′ of a group G, find two elements x∈ A and y∈ B
that would belong to given subsets (usually subgroups) A,B ⊆ G and satisfy
x ·w · y= w′, provided at least one such pair of elements exists.
We note that if in the above problem A= B is a subgroup, then this problem is also known
as the double coset problem.
We also note that some x and y satisfying the equality x ·w · y = w′ always exist (e.g.
x = 1, y = w−1w′), so the point is to have them satisfy the conditions x ∈ A and y ∈ B.
We therefore will not usually refer to this problem as a subgroup-restricted decomposition
search problem because it is always going to be subgroup-restricted; otherwise it does not
make much sense. We also note that the most commonly considered special case of the
decomposition search problem so far is where A= B.
We are going to show in Section 11 that solving the conjugacy search problem is unnec-
essary for an adversary to get the common secret key in the Ko-Lee (or any similar) protocol
(see our Section 3); it is sufficient to solve a seemingly easier decomposition search problem.
This was mentioned, in passing, in the paper [26], but the significance of this observation was
downplayed there.
We note that the membership condition x,y ∈ Amay not be easy to verify for some subsets
A. The authors of [26] do not address this problem; instead they mention, in justice, that if
one uses a “brute force” attack by simply going over elements of A one at a time, the above
condition will be satisfied automatically. This however may not be the case with other, more
practical, attacks.
We also note that the conjugacy search problem is a special case of the decomposition
problem where w′ is conjugate to w and x = y−1. The claim that the decomposition problem
should be easier than the conjugacy search problem is intuitively clear since it is generally
easier to solve an equation with two unknowns than a special case of the same equation with
just one unknown. We admit however that there might be exceptions to this general rule.
Now we give a formal description of a typical protocol based on the decomposition prob-
lem. There is a public group G, a public element w ∈ G, and two public subgroups A,B⊆ G
commuting elementwise, i.e., ab= ba for any a ∈ A,b ∈ B.
(1) Alice randomly selects private elements a1,a2 ∈A. Then she sends the element a1wa2
to Bob.
(2) Bob randomly selects private elements b1,b2 ∈ B. Then he sends the element b1wb2
to Alice.
(3) Alice computes KA = a1b1wb2a2, and Bob computes KB = b2a1wb1a2. Since aibi =
biai in G, one has KA = KB =K (as an element of G), which is now Alice’s and Bob’s
common secret key.
We now discuss several modifications of the above protocol.
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4.1. “Twisted” protocol. This idea is due to Shpilrain and Ushakov [63]; the following
modification of the above protocol appears to be more secure (at least for some choices of the
platform group) against so-called “length based” attacks (see e.g. [13], [14], [22]), according
to computer experiments. Again, there is a public groupG and two public subgroups A,B≤G
commuting elementwise.
(1) Alice randomly selects private elements a1 ∈ A and b1 ∈ B. Then she sends the
element a1wb1 to Bob.
(2) Bob randomly selects private elements b2 ∈ B and a2 ∈ A. Then he sends the element
b2wa2 to Alice.
(3) Alice computes KA = a1b2wa2b1 = b2a1wb1a2, and Bob computes KB = b2a1wb1a2.
Since aibi = biai in G, one has KA = KB = K (as an element of G), which is now
Alice’s and Bob’s common secret key.
4.2. Finding intersection of given subgroups. Another modification of the protocol in Sec-
tion 4 is also due to Shpilrain and Ushakov [63]. First we give a sketch of the idea.
Let G be a group and g ∈ G. Denote by CG(g) the centralizer of g in G, i.e., the set
of elements h ∈ G such that hg = gh. For S = {g1, . . . ,gk} ⊆ G, CG(g1, . . . ,gk) denotes the
centralizer of S in G, which is the intersection of the centralizers CG(gi), i= 1, ...,k.
Now, given a public w ∈ G, Alice privately selects a1 ∈ G and publishes a subgroup B ⊆
CG(a1) (we tacitly assume here that B can be computed efficiently). Similarly, Bob privately
selects b2 ∈ G and publishes a subgroup A ⊆ CG(b2). Alice then selects a2 ∈ A and sends
w1 = a1wa2 to Bob, while Bob selects b1 ∈ B and sends w2 = b1wb2 to Alice.
Thus, in the first transmission, say, the adversary faces the problem of finding a1,a2 such
that w1 = a1wa2, where a2 ∈ A, but there is no explicit indication of where to choose a1 from.
Therefore, before arranging something like a length based attack in this case, the adversary
would have to compute generators of the centralizer CG(B) first (because a1 ∈CG(B)), which
is usually a hard problem by itself since it basically amounts to finding the intersection of
the centralizers of individual elements, and finding (the generators of) the intersection of
subgroups is a notoriously difficult problem for most groups considered in combinatorial
group theory.
Now we give a formal description of the protocol from [63]. As usual, there is a public
group G, and let w ∈ G be public, too.
(1) Alice chooses an element a1 ∈ G, chooses a subgroup of CG(a1), and publishes its
generators A= {α1, . . . ,αk}.
(2) Bob chooses an element b2 ∈ G, chooses a subgroup of CG(b2), and publishes its
generators B= {β1, . . . ,βm}.
(3) Alice chooses a random element a2 from gp< β1, . . . ,βm > and sends PA = a1wa2 to
Bob.
(4) Bob chooses a random element b1 from gp < α1, . . . ,αk > and sends PB = b1wb2 to
Alice.
(5) Alice computes KA = a1PBa2.
(6) Bob computes KB = b1PAb2.
Since a1b1 = b1a1 and a2b2 = b2a2, we have K = KA = KB, the shared secret key.
We note that in [72], an attack on this protocol was offered (in the case where a braid group
is used as the platform), using what the author calls the linear centralizer method. Then, in
[3], another method of cryptanalysis (called the algebraic span cryptanalysis) was offered,
applicable to platform groups that admit an efficient linear representation. This method yields
attacks on various protocols, including the one in this section, if a braid group is used as the
platform.
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4.3. Commutative subgroups. Instead of using commuting subgroups A,B ≤ G, one can
use commutative subgroups. Thus, suppose A,B≤ G are two public commutative subgroups
(or subsemigroups) of a group G, and let w ∈ G be a public element.
(1) Alice randomly selects private elements a1 ∈ A, b1 ∈ B. Then she sends the element
a1wb1 to Bob.
(2) Bob randomly selects private elements a2 ∈ A, b2 ∈ B. Then he sends the element
a2wb2 to Alice.
(3) Alice computes KA = a1a2wb2b1, and Bob computes KB = a2a1wb1b2. Since a1a2 =
a2a1 and b1b2 = b2b1 in G, one has KA = KB = K (as an element of G), which is now
Alice’s and Bob’s common secret key.
4.4. The factorization problem. The factorization search problem is a special case of the
decomposition search problem:
Given an element w of a group G and two subgroups A,B≤ G, find any two
elements a ∈ A and b ∈ B that would satisfy a · b = w, provided at least one
such pair of elements exists.
The following protocol relies in its security on the computational hardness of the factoriza-
tion search problem. As before, there is a public group G, and two public subgroups A,B≤G
commuting elementwise, i.e., ab= ba for any a ∈ A,b ∈ B.
(1) Alice randomly selects private elements a1 ∈ A,b1 ∈ B. Then she sends the element
a1b1 to Bob.
(2) Bob randomly selects private elements a2 ∈ A,b2 ∈ B. Then he sends the element
a2b2 to Alice.
(3) Alice computes
KA = b1(a2b2)a1 = a2b1a1b2 = a2a1b1b2,
and Bob computes
KB = a2(a1b1)b2 = a2a1b1b2.
Thus, KA = KB = K is now Alice’s and Bob’s common secret key.
We note that the adversary, Eve, who knows the elements a1b1 and a2b2, can compute
(a1b1)(a2b2) = a1b1a2b2 = a1a2b1b2 and (a2b2)(a1b1) = a2a1b2b1, but neither of these prod-
ucts is equal to K if a1a2 6= a2a1 and b1b2 6= b2b1.
Finally, we point out a decision factorization problem:
Given an element w of a group G and two subgroups A,B ≤ G, find out
whether or not there are two elements a ∈ A and b ∈ B such that w= a ·b.
This seems to be a new and non-trivial algorithmic problem in group theory, motivated by
cryptography.
5. THE WORD PROBLEM
The word problem “needs no introduction”, but it probably makes sense to spell out the
word search problem:
Suppose H is a group given by a finite presentation < X ;R> and let F(X) be
the free group with the set X of free generators. Given a group word w in the
alphabet X , find a sequence of conjugates of elements from R whose product
is equal to w in the free group F(X).
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Long time ago, there was an attempt to use the undecidability of the decision word problem
(in some groups) in public key cryptography [31]. This was, in fact, historically the first
attempt to employ a hard algorithmic problem from combinatorial group theory in public key
cryptography. However, as was pointed out in [4], the problem that is actually used in [31]
is not the word problem, but the word choice problem: given g,w1,w2 ∈ G, find out whether
g = w1 or g= w2 in G, provided one of the two equalities holds. In this problem, both parts
are recursively solvable for any recursively presented platform group G because they both are
the “yes” parts of the word problem. Therefore, undecidability of the actual word problem in
the platform group has no bearing on the security of the encryption scheme in [31].
On the other hand, employing decision problems (as opposed to search problems) in
public-key cryptography would allow one to depart from the canonical paradigm and con-
struct cryptographic protocols with new properties, impossible in the canonical model. In
particular, such protocols can be secure against some “brute force” attacks by a computa-
tionally unbounded adversary. There is a price to pay for that, but the price is reasonable: a
legitimate receiver decrypts correctly with probability that can be made very close to 1, but
not equal to 1. This idea was implemented in [48], so the exposition below follows that paper.
We assume that the sender (Bob) is given a presentation Γ (published by the receiver Alice)
of a group G by generators and defining relators:
Γ = 〈x1,x2, . . . ,xn | r1,r2, . . . 〉.
No further information about the group G is available to Bob.
Bob is instructed to transmit his private bit to Alice by transmitting a word u= u(x1, . . . ,xn)
equal to 1 in G in place of “1” and a word v = v(x1, . . . ,xn) not equal to 1 in G in place of
“0”.
Now we have to specify the algorithms that Bob should use to select his words.
Algorithm “0” (for selecting a word v = v(x1, . . . ,xn) not equal to 1 in G) is quite simple:
Bob just selects a random word by building it letter-by-letter, selecting each letter uniformly
from the set X = {x1, . . . ,xn,x−11 , . . . ,x−1n }. The length of such a word should be a random
integer from an interval that Bob selects up front, based on his computational abilities.
Algorithm “1” (for selecting a word u= u(x1, . . . ,xn) equal to 1 in G) is slightly more com-
plex. It amounts to applying a random sequence of operations of the following two kinds,
starting with the empty word:
(1) Inserting into a random place in the current word a pair hh−1 for a random word h.
(2) Inserting into a random place in the current word a random conjugate g−1rig of a
random defining relator ri.
The length of the resulting word should be in the same range as the length of the output of
Algorithm “0”, for indistinguishability.
5.1. Encryption emulation attack. Now let us see what happens if a computationally un-
bounded adversary uses what is called encryption emulation attack on Bob’s encryption. This
kind of attack always succeeds against “traditional” encryption protocols where the receiver
decrypts correctly with probability exactly 1. The encryption emulation attack is:
For either bit, generate its encryption over and over again, each time with
fresh randomness, until the ciphertext to be attacked is obtained. Then the
corresponding plaintext is the bit that was encrypted.
Thus, the (computationally unbounded) adversary is building up two lists, corresponding
to two algorithms above. Our first observation is that the list that corresponds to the Algo-
rithm “0” is useless to the adversary because it is eventually going to contain all words in
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the alphabet X = {x1, . . . ,xn,x−11 , . . . ,x−1n }. Therefore, the adversary may just as well forget
about this list and focus on the other one, that corresponds to the Algorithm “1”.
Now the situation boils down to the following: if a word w transmitted by Bob appears on
the list, then it is equal to 1 in G. If not, then not. The only problem is: how can one conclude
that w does not appear on the list if the list is infinite? Of course, there is no infinity in real
life, so the list is actually finite because of Bob’s computational limitations. Still, at least in
theory, the adversary does not know a bound on the size of the list if she does not know Bob’s
computational limits.
Then, perhaps the adversary can stop at some point and conclude that w 6= 1 with over-
whelming probability, just like Alice does? The point however is that this probability may not
at all be as “overwhelming” as the probability of the correct decryption by Alice. Compare:
(1) For Alice to decrypt correctly “with overwhelming probability”, the probability
P1(N) for a random word w of length N not to be equal to 1 should converge to 1
(reasonably fast) as N goes to infinity.
(2) For the adversary to decrypt correctly “with overwhelming probability”, the prob-
ability P2(N, f (N)) for a random word w of length N produced by the Algorithm
“1” to have a proof of length ≤ f (N) verifying that w = 1, should converge to 1 as
N goes to infinity. Here f (N) represents the adversary’s computational capabilities;
this function can be arbitrary, but fixed.
We see that the functions P1(N) and P2(N) are of very different nature, and any correlation
between them is unlikely. We note that the function P1(N) is generally well understood, and
in particular, it is known that in any infinite group G, P1(N) indeed converges to 1 as N goes
to infinity.
On the other hand, functions P2(N, f (N)) are more complex; note also that they may
depend on a particular algorithm used by Bob to produce words equal to 1. The Algorithm “1”
described in this section is very straightforward; there are more delicate algorithms discussed
in [45].
Functions P2(N, f (N)) are currently subject of active research, and in particular, it appears
likely that there are groups in which P2(N, f (N)) does not converge to 1 at all, if an algorithm
used to produce words equal to 1 is chosen intelligently.
We also note in passing that if in a group G the word problem is recursively unsolvable,
then the length of a proof verifying that w= 1 in G is not bounded by any recursive function
of the length of w.
Of course, in real life, the adversary may know a bound on the size of the list based on a
general idea of what kind of hardware may be available to Bob; but then again, in real life
the adversary would be computationally bounded, too. Here we note (again, in passing) that
there are groups G with efficiently solvable word problem and words w of length n equal to
1 in G, such that the length of a proof verifying that w= 1 in G is not bounded by any tower
of exponents in n, see [51].
Thus, the bottom line is: in theory, the adversary cannot positively identify the bit that Bob
has encrypted by a word w if she just uses the “encryption emulation” attack. In fact, such an
identification would be equivalent to solving the word problem in G, which would contradict
the well-known fact that there are (finitely presented) groups with recursively unsolvable
word problem.
It would be nice, of course, if the adversary was unable to positively decrypt using “en-
cryption emulation” attacks even if she did know Bob’s computational limitations. This, too,
can be arranged, see the following subsection.
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5.2. Encryption: trick and treat. Building on the ideas from the previous subsection and
combining them with a simple yet subtle trick, we describe here an encryption protocol from
[48] that has the following features:
(F1) Bob encrypts his private bit sequence by a word in a public alphabet X .
(F2) Alice (the receiver) decrypts Bob’s transmission correctly with probability that can
be made arbitrarily close to 1, but not equal to 1.
(F3) The adversary, Eve, is assumed to have no bound on the speed of computation or on
the storage space.
(F4) Eve is assumed to have complete information on the algorithm(s) and hardware that
Bob uses for encryption. However, Eve cannot predict outputs of Bob’s random
numbers generator.
(F5) Eve cannot decrypt Bob’s bit correctly with probability > 3
4
by emulating Bob’s en-
cryption algorithm.
This leaves Eve with the only possibility: to attack Alice’s decryption algorithm or her
algorithm for obtaining public keys, but this is a different story. Here we only discuss the
encryption emulation attack, to make a point that this attack can be unsuccessful if the prob-
ability of the legitimate decryption is close to 1, but not exactly 1.
Here is the relevant protocol (for encrypting a single bit).
(P0) Alice publishes two presentations:
Γ1 = 〈x1,x2, . . . ,xn | r1,r2, . . . 〉
Γ2 = 〈x1,x2, . . . ,xn | s1,s2, . . . 〉.
One of them defines the trivial group, whereas the other one defines an infinite group,
but only Alice knows which one is which. Bob is instructed to transmit his private
bit to Alice as follows:
(P1) In place of “1”, Bob transmits a pair of words (w1,w2) in the alphabet
X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn,x−11 , . . . ,x−1n }, where w1 is selected randomly, while w2 is selected
to be equal to 1 in the group G2 defined by Γ2 (see e.g. Algorithm “1” in the previous
section).
(P2) In place of “0”, Bob transmits a pair of words (w1,w2), where w2 is selected ran-
domly, while w1 is selected to be equal to 1 in the group G1 defined by Γ1.
Under our assumptions (F3), (F4) Eve can identify the word(s) in the transmitted pair
which is/are equal to 1 in the corresponding presentation(s), as well as the word, if any,
which is not equal to 1. There are the following possibilities:
(1) w1 = 1 in G1, w2 = 1 in G2;
(2) w1 = 1 in G1, w2 6= 1 in G2;
(3) w1 6= 1 in G1, w2 = 1 in G2.
It is easy to see that the possibility (1) occurs with probability 1
2
(when Bob wants to
transmit “1” and G1 is trivial, or when Bob wants to transmit “0” and G2 is trivial). If this
possibility occurs, Eve cannot decrypt Bob’s bit correctly with probability > 1
2
. Indeed, the
only way for Eve to decrypt in this case would be to find out which presentation Γi defines
the trivial group, i.e., she would have to attack Alice’s algorithm for obtaining a public key,
which would not be part of the encryption emulation attack anymore. Here we just note, in
passing, that there are many different ways to construct presentations of the trivial group,
some of them involving a lot of random choices. See e.g. [38] for a survey on the subject.
In any case, our claim (F5) was that Eve cannot decrypt Bob’s bit correctly with probability
> 3
4
by emulating Bob’s encryption algorithm, which is obviously true in this scheme since
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the probability for Eve to decrypt correctly is, in fact, precisely 1
2
· 1
2
+ 1
2
· 1 = 3
4
. (Note that
Eve decrypts correctly with probability 1 if either of the possibilities (2) or (3) above occurs.)
6. THE ISOMORPHISM INVERSION PROBLEM
The isomorphism (decision) problem for groups is very well known: suppose two groups
are given by their finite presentations in terms of generators and defining relators, then find
out whether the groups are isomorphic. The search version of this problem is well known,
too: given two finite presentations defining isomorphic groups, find a particular isomorphism
between the groups.
Now the following problem, of interest in cryptography, is not what was previously con-
sidered in combinatorial group theory:
Given two finite presentations defining isomorphic groups, G and H , and an
isomorphism ϕ : G→ H , find ϕ−1.
Now we describe an encryption scheme whose security is based on the alleged computa-
tional hardness of the isomorphism inversion problem. Our idea itself is quite simple: encrypt
with a public isomorphism ϕ that is computationally infeasible for the adversary to invert. A
legitimate receiver, on the other hand, can efficiently compute ϕ−1 because she knows a fac-
torization of ϕ in a product of “elementary”, easily invertible, isomorphisms.
What is interesting to note is that this encryption is homomorphic because ϕ(g1g2) =
ϕ(g1)ϕ(g2) for any g1,g2 ∈ G. The significance of this observation is due to a result of [49]:
if the group G is a non-abelian finite simple group, then any homomorphic encryption on
G can be converted to a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme, i.e., encryption that
respects not just one but two operations: either boolean AND and OR or arithmetic addition
and multiplication.
In summary, a relevant scheme can be built as follows. Given a public presentation of
a group G by generators and defining relations, the receiver (Alice) uses a chain of private
“elementary” isomorphisms G→H1 → ...→Hk → H , each of which is easily invertible, but
the (public) composite isomorphism ϕ : G→ H is hard to invert without the knowledge of a
factorization in a product of “elementary” ones. (Note that ϕ is published as a map taking
the generators of G to words in the generators of H .) Having obtained this way a (private)
presentation H , Alice discards some of the defining relations to obtain a public presentation
Hˆ. Thus, the group H , as well as the group G (which is isomorphic to H), is a homomorphic
image of the group Hˆ. (Note that Hˆ has the same set of generators as H does but has fewer
defining relations.) Now the sender (Bob), who wants to encrypt his plaintext g ∈ G, selects
an arbitrary word wg (in the generators ofG) representing the element g and applies the public
isomorphism ϕ to wg to get ϕ(wg), which is a word in the generators of H (or Hˆ, since H and
Hˆ have the same set of generators). He then selects an arbitrary word hg in the generators of Hˆ
representing the same element of Hˆ as ϕ(wg) does, and this is now his ciphertext: hg = E(g).
To decrypt, Alice applies her private map ϕ−1 (which is a map taking the generators of Hˆ
to words in the generators of G) to hg to get a word w
′
g = ϕ
−1(hg). This word w′g represents
the same element of G as wg does because ϕ
−1(hg) = ϕ−1(ϕ(wg)) = wg in the group G since
both ϕ and ϕ−1 are homomorphisms, and the composition of ϕ and ϕ−1 is the identity map
on the group G, i.e., it takes every word in the generators of G to a word representing the
same element of G. Thus, Alice decrypts correctly.
We emphasize here that a plaintext is a group element g ∈ G, not a word in the generators
of G. This implies, in particular, that there should be some kind of canonical way (a “normal
form”) of representing elements of G. For example, for elements of an alternating group Am
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(these groups are finite non-abelian simple groups if m≥ 5), such a canonical representation
can be the standard representation by a permutation of the set {1, . . . ,m}.
Now we are going to give more details on how one can construct a sequence of “elemen-
tary” isomorphisms starting with a given presentation of a group G = 〈x1,x2, . . . | r1,r2, . . . 〉.
(Here x1,x2, . . . are generators and r1,r2, . . . are defining relators). These “elementary” iso-
morphisms are called Tietze transformations. They are universal in the sense that they can be
applied to any (semi)group presentation. Tietze transformations are of the following types:
(T1): Introducing a new generator: Replace 〈x1,x2, . . . | r1,r2, . . . 〉 by 〈y,x1,x2, . . . |
ys−1,r1,r2, . . . 〉, where s = s(x1,x2, . . . ) is an arbitrary element in the generators
x1,x2, . . . .
(T2): Canceling a generator (this is the converse of (T1)): If we have a presentation of the
form 〈y,x1,x2, . . . | q,r1,r2, . . . 〉, where q is of the form ys−1, and s,r1,r2, . . . are in
the group generated by x1,x2, . . . , replace this presentation by 〈x1,x2, . . . | r1,r2, . . . 〉.
(T3): Applying an automorphism: Apply an automorphism of the free group generated by
x1,x2, . . . to all the relators r1,r2, . . . .
(T4): Changing defining relators: Replace the set r1,r2, . . . of defining relators by another
set r′1,r
′
2, . . . with the same normal closure. That means, each of r
′
1,r
′
2, . . . should
belong to the normal subgroup generated by r1,r2, . . . , and vice versa.
Tietze proved (see e.g. [30]) that two groups given by presentations 〈x1,x2, . . . | r1,r2, . . . 〉
and 〈y1,y2, . . . | s1,s2, . . . 〉 are isomorphic if and only if one can get from one of the presenta-
tions to the other by a sequence of transformations (T1)–(T4).
For each Tietze transformation of the types (T1)–(T3), it is easy to obtain an explicit iso-
morphism (as a map on generators) and its inverse. For a Tietze transformation of the type
(T4), the isomorphism is just the identity map. We would like here to make Tietze transfor-
mations of the type (T4) recursive, because a priori it is not clear how Alice can actually
implement these transformations. Thus, Alice can use the following recursive version of
(T4):
(T4′) In the set r1,r2, . . . , replace some ri by one of the: r−1i , rir j, rir
−1
j , r jri, r jr
−1
i , x
−1
k rixk,
xkrix
−1
k , where j 6= i, and k is arbitrary.
One particularly useful feature of Tietze transformations is that they can break long defin-
ing relators into short pieces (of length 3 or 4, say) at the expense of introducing more gen-
erators, as illustrated by the following simple example. In this example, we start with a
presentation having two relators of length 5 in 3 generators, and end up with a presentation
having 4 relators of length 3 and one relator of length 4, in 6 generators. The∼= symbol below
means “is isomorphic to.”
Example 1. G= 〈x1,x2,x3 | x21x32, x1x22x−11 x3〉 ∼= 〈x1,x2,x3,x4 | x4 = x21, x4x32, x1x22x−11 x3〉∼= 〈x1,x2,x3,x4,x5 | x5 = x1x22, x4 = x21, x4x32, x5x−11 x3〉 ∼= (now switching x1 and x5 – this is
(T3))
∼= 〈x1,x2,x3,x4,x5 | x1 = x5x22, x4 = x25, x4x32, x1x−15 x3〉∼= 〈x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6 | x−11 x5x22, x−14 x25, x−16 x4x2, x6x22, x1x−15 x3〉= H.
We note that this procedure of breaking relators into pieces of length 3 increases the total
relator length (measured as the sum of the length of all relators) by at most a factor of 2.
Since we need our “elementary” isomorphisms to be also given in the form xi → yi, we
note that the isomorphism between the first two presentations above is given by xi → xi, i=
1,2,3, and the inverse isomorphism is given by xi → xi, i= 1,2,3; x4 → x21. By composing
elementary isomorphisms, we compute the isomorphism ϕ between the first and the last
PROBLEMS IN GROUP THEORY MOTIVATED BY CRYPTOGRAPHY 15
presentations: ϕ : x1 → x5, x2 → x2, x3 → x3. By composing the inverses of elementary
isomorphisms, we compute ϕ−1 : x1 → x1x22, x2 → x2, x3 → x3, x4 → x21, x5 → x1, x6 →
x21x2. We see that even in this toy example, recovering ϕ
−1 from the public ϕ is not quite
trivial without knowing a sequence of intermediate Tietze transformations. Furthermore,
if Alice discards, say, two of the relators from the last presentation to get a public Hˆ =
〈x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6 | x−11 x5x22, x6x22, x1x−15 x3, then there is no isomorphism between Hˆ and
G whatsoever, and the problem for the adversary is now even less trivial: to find relators
completing the public presentation Hˆ to a presentation H isomorphic to G by way of the
public isomorphism ϕ, and then find ϕ−1.
Moreover, ϕ as a map on the generators of Gmay not induce an onto homomorphism from
G to Hˆ, and this will deprive the adversary even from the “brute force” attack by looking for a
map ψ on the generators of Hˆ such that ψ : Hˆ→G is a homomorphism, and ψ(ϕ) is identical
on G. If, say, in the example above we discard the relator x1x
−1
5 x3 from the final presentation
H , then x4 will not be in the subgroup of Hˆ generated by ϕ(xi), and therefore there cannot
possibly be a ψ : Hˆ → G such that ψ(ϕ) is identical on G.
We now describe a homomorphic public key encryption scheme a little more formally.
: Key Generation: Let ϕ : G→ H be an isomorphism. Alice’s public key then consists of ϕ
as well as presentations G and Hˆ, where Hˆ is obtained from H by keeping all of the
generators but discarding some of the relators. Alice’s private key consists of ϕ−1
and H .
: Encrypt: Bob’s plaintext is g ∈ G. To encrypt, he selects an arbitrary word wg in the
generators of G representing the element g and applies the public isomorphism ϕ
to wg to get ϕ(wg), which is a word in the generators of H (or Hˆ, since H and Hˆ have
the same set of generators). He then selects an arbitrary word hg in the generators of
Hˆ representing the same element of Hˆ as ϕ(wg) does, and this is now his ciphertext:
hg = E(g).
: Decrypt: To decrypt, Alice applies her private map ϕ−1 to hg to get a word w′g = ϕ−1(hg).
This word w′g represents the same element of G as wg does because ϕ−1(hg) =
ϕ−1(ϕ(wg)) = wg in the group G since both ϕ and ϕ−1 are homomorphisms, and
the composition of ϕ and ϕ−1 is the identity map on the group G.
In the following example, we use the presentations
G=
〈
x1,x2,x3 | x21x32, x1x22x−11 x3
〉
, Hˆ =
〈
x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6 | x1 = x5x22, x4 = x25,
x6 = x4x2, x6x
2
2
〉
, and the isomorphism ϕ : x1 → x5, x2 → x2, x3 → x3 from Example 1 to
illustrate how encryption works.
Example 2. Let the plaintext be the element g ∈ G represented by the word x1x2. Then
ϕ(x1x2) = x5x2. Then the word x5x2 is randomized in Hˆ by using relators of Hˆ as well as
“trivial” relators xix
−1
i = 1 and x
−1
i xi = 1. For example: multiply x5x2 by x4x
−1
4 to get
x4x
−1
4 x5x2. Then replace x4 by x
2
5, according to one of the relators of Hˆ, and get x
2
5x
−1
4 x5x2.
Now insert x6x
−1
6 between x5 and x2 to get x
2
5x
−1
4 x5x6x
−1
6 x2, and then replace x6 by x4x2 to get
x25x
−1
4 x5x4x2x
−1
6 x2, which can be used as the encryption E(g).
Finally, we note that automorphisms, instead of general isomorphisms, were used in [18]
and [37] to build public key cryptographic primitives employing the same general idea of
building an automorphism as a composition of elementary ones. In [37], those were auto-
morphisms of a polynomial algebra, while in [18] automorphisms of a tropical algebra were
used along the same lines. We also note that “elementary isomorphisms” (i.e., Tietze trans-
formations) are universal in nature and can be adapted to most any algebraic structure, see
e.g. [36], [35], and [65].
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7. SEMIDIRECT PRODUCT OF GROUPS AND MORE PECULIAR COMPUTATIONAL
ASSUMPTIONS
Using a semidirect product of (semi)groups as the platform for a very simple key exchange
protocol (inspired by the Diffie-Hellman protocol) yields new and sometimes rather peculiar
computational assumptions. The exposition in this section follows [20] (see also [24]).
First we recall the definition of a semidirect product:
Definition 1. Let G,H be two groups, let Aut(G) be the group of automorphisms of G, and
let ρ : H → Aut(G) be a homomorphism. Then the semidirect product of G and H is the set
Γ = G⋊ρH = {(g,h) : g ∈G, h ∈ H}
with the group operation given by
(g,h)(g′,h′) = (gρ(h
′) ·g′, h ·h′).
Here gρ(h
′) denotes the image of g under the automorphism ρ(h′), and when we write a
product h ·h′ of two morphisms, this means that h is applied first.
In this section, we focus on a special case of this construction, where the group H is just
a subgroup of the group Aut(G). If H = Aut(G), then the corresponding semidirect product
is called the holomorph of the group G. Thus, the holomorph of G, usually denoted by
Hol(G), is the set of all pairs (g, φ), where g ∈ G, φ ∈ Aut(G), with the group operation
given by (g, φ) · (g′, φ′) = (φ′(g) ·g′, φ ·φ′).
It is often more practical to use a subgroup of Aut(G) in this construction, and this is
exactly what we do below, where we describe a key exchange protocol that uses (as the
platform) an extension of a group G by a cyclic group of automorphisms.
One can also use this construction if G is not necessarily a group, but just a semigroup,
and/or consider endomorphisms of G, not necessarily automorphisms. Then the result will
be a semigroup
Thus, let G be a (semi)group. An element g ∈ G is chosen and made public as well as
an arbitrary automorphism φ ∈ Aut(G) (or an arbitrary endomorphism φ ∈ End(G)). Bob
chooses a private n ∈N, while Alice chooses a private m ∈ N. Both Alice and Bob are going
to work with elements of the form (g,φr), where g ∈G, r ∈N. Note that two elements of this
form are multiplied as follows: (g,φr) · (h,φs) = (φs(g) ·h, φr+s).
The following is a public key exchange protocol between Alice and Bob.
(1) Alice computes (g,φ)m = (φm−1(g) · · ·φ2(g) · φ(g) · g, φm) and sends only the first
component of this pair to Bob. Thus, she sends to Bob only the element a =
φm−1(g) · · ·φ2(g) ·φ(g) ·g of the (semi)group G.
(2) Bob computes (g,φ)n = (φn−1(g) · · ·φ2(g) · φ(g) · g, φn) and sends only the first
component of this pair to Alice. Thus, he sends to Alice only the element b =
φn−1(g) · · ·φ2(g) ·φ(g) ·g of the (semi)group G.
(3) Alice computes (b,x) · (a, φm) = (φm(b) · a, x ·φm). Her key is now KA = φm(b) · a.
Note that she does not actually “compute” x · φm because she does not know the
automorphism x= φn; recall that it was not transmitted to her. But she does not need
it to compute KA.
(4) Bob computes (a,y) · (b, φn) = (φn(a) · b, y · φn). His key is now KB = φn(a) · b.
Again, Bob does not actually “compute” y · φn because he does not know the auto-
morphism y= φm.
(5) Since (b,x) · (a, φm) = (a, y) · (b, φn) = (g, φ)m+n, we should have KA = KB = K,
the shared secret key.
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Remark 1. Note that, in contrast with the original Diffie-Hellman key exchange, correctness
here is based on the equality hm · hn = hn · hm = hm+n rather than on the equality (hm)n =
(hn)m = hmn. In the original Diffie-Hellman set up, our trick would not work because, if
the shared key K was just the product of two openly transmitted elements, then anybody,
including the eavesdropper, could compute K.
We note that the general protocol above can be used with any non-commutative group G
if φ is selected to be a non-trivial inner automorphism, i.e., conjugation by an element which
is not in the center of G. Furthermore, it can be used with any non-commutative semigroup
G as well, as long as G has some invertible elements; these can be used to produce inner
automorphisms. A typical example of such a semigroup would be a semigroup of matrices
over some ring.
Now let G be a non-commutative (semi)group and let h ∈ G be an invertible non-central
element. Then conjugation by h is a non-identical inner automorphism of G that we denote
by ϕh. We use an extension of the semigroup G by the inner automorphism ϕh, as described
in the beginning of this section. For any element g ∈G and for any integer k ≥ 1, we have
ϕh(g) = g
−1gh; ϕkh(g) = h
−kghk.
Now our general protocol is specialized in this case as follows.
(1) Alice and Bob agree on a (semi)group G and on public elements g,h ∈G, where h is
an invertible non-central element.
(2) Alice selects a private positive integer m, and Bob selects a private positive integer n.
(3) Alice computes (g,ϕh)
m = (h−m+1ghm−1 · · ·h−2gh2 · h−1gh · g, ϕmh ) and sends only
the first component of this pair to Bob. Thus, she sends to Bob only the element
A= h−m+1ghm−1 · · ·h−2gh2 ·h−1gh ·g= h−m(hg)m.
(4) Bob computes (g,ϕh)
n = (h−n+1ghn−1 · · ·h−2gh2 ·h−1gh ·g, ϕnh) and sends only the
first component of this pair to Alice. Thus, he sends to Alice only the element
B= h−n+1ghn−1 · · ·h−2gh2 ·h−1gh ·g= h−n(hg)n.
(5) Alice computes (B,x) ·(A, ϕmh ) = (ϕmh (B) ·A, x ·ϕmh ). Her key is now KAlice = ϕmh (B) ·
A = h−(m+n)(hg)m+n. Note that she does not actually “compute” x ·ϕmh because she
does not know the automorphism x= ϕnh; recall that it was not transmitted to her. But
she does not need it to compute KAlice.
(6) Bob computes (A,y) · (B, ϕnh) = (ϕnh(A) ·B, y ·ϕnh). His key is now KBob = ϕnh(A) ·
B. Again, Bob does not actually “compute” y · ϕnh because he does not know the
automorphism y= ϕmh .
(7) Since (B,x) · (A, ϕmh ) = (A, y) · (B, ϕnh) = (M, ϕh)m+n, we should have KAlice =
KBob = K, the shared secret key.
Thus, the shared secret key in this protocol is
K = ϕmh (B) ·A= ϕnh(A) ·B= h−(m+n)(hg)m+n.
Therefore, our security assumption here is that it is computationally hard to retrieve the
key K = h−(m+n)(hg)m+n from the quadruple (h, g, h−m(hg)m, h−n(hg)n). In particular, we
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have to take care that the elements h and hg do not commute because otherwise, K is just a
product of h−m(hg)m and h−n(hg)n. Once again, the problem is:
Given a (semi)group G and elements g, h, h−m(hg)m, and h−n(hg)n of G,
find h−(m+n)(hg)m+n.
Compare this to the Diffie-Hellman problem from Section 2:
Given a (semi)group G and elements g,gn, and gm of G, find gmn.
A weaker security assumption arises if an eavesdropper tries to recover a private exponent
from a transmission, i.e., to recover, say, m from h−m(hg)m. A special case of this problem,
where h= 1, is the “discrete log” problem, namely: recover m from g and gm. However, the
“discrete log” problem is a problem on cyclic, in particular abelian, groups, whereas in the
former problem it is essential that g and h do not commute.
By varying the automorphism (or endomorphism) used for an extension of G, one can get
many other security assumptions. However, many (semi)groups G just do not have outer (i.e.,
non-inner) automorphisms, so there is no guarantee that a selected platform (semi)group will
have any outer automorphisms. On the other hand, it will have inner automorphisms as long
as it has invertible non-central elements.
In conclusion, we note that there is always a concern (as well as in the standard Diffie-
Hellman protocol) about the orders of public elements (in our case, about the orders of h and
hg): if one of the orders is too small, then a brute force attack may be feasible.
If a group of matrices of small size is chosen as the platform, then the above protocol turns
out to be vulnerable to a “linear algebra attack”, similar to an attack on Stickel’s protocol [70]
offered in [59], albeit more sophisticated, see [41], [55], [54]. A composition of conjugating
automorphism with a field automorphism was employed in [23], but this automorphism still
turned out to be not complex enough to make the protocol withstand a linear algebra attack,
see [8], [55]. Selecting a good platform (semi)group for the protocol in this section still
remains an open problem.
Finally, we mention another, rather different, proposal [50] of a cryptosystem based on the
semidirect product of two groups and yet another, more complex, proposal of a key agreement
based on the semidirect product of two monoids [2].
8. THE SUBSET SUM AND THE KNAPSACK PROBLEMS
As usual, elements of a group G are given as words in the alphabet X ∪X−1. We begin
with three decision problems:
The subset sum problem (SSP): Given g1, . . . ,gk,g ∈ G decide if
(1) g= gε11 . . .g
εk
k
for some ε1, . . . ,εk ∈ {0,1}.
The knapsack problem (KP): Given g1, . . . ,gk,g ∈ G decide if
(2) g= gε11 . . .g
εk
k
for some non-negative integers ε1, . . . ,εk.
The third problem is equivalent toKP in the abelian case, but in general this is a completely
different problem:
The Submonoid membership problem (SMP): Given elements g1, . . . ,gk,g ∈ G decide if
g belongs to the submonoid generated by g1, . . . ,gk in G, i.e., if the following equality holds
for some gi1 , . . . ,gis ∈ {g1, . . . ,gk},s ∈N:
(3) g= gi1 , . . . ,gis .
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The restriction of SMP to the case where the set of generators {g1, . . . ,gn} is closed under
inversion (so that the submonoid is actually a subgroup of G) is a well-known subgroup
membership problem, one of the most basic algorithmic problems in group theory.
There are also natural search versions of the decision problems above, where the goal is to
find a particular solution to the equations (1), (2), or (3), provided that solutions do exist.
We also mention, in passing, an interesting research avenue explored in [39]: many search
problems can be converted to optimization problems asking for an “optimal” (usually mean-
ing “minimal”) solution of the corresponding search problem. A well-known example of an
optimization problems is the geodesic problem: given a word in the generators of a group G,
find a word of minimum length representing the same element of G.
The classical (i.e., not group-theoretical) subset sum problem is one of the very basic NP-
complete problems, so there is extensive related bibliography (see [25]). The SSP problem
attracted a lot of extra attention when Merkle and Hellmann designed a public key cryptosys-
tem [33] based on a variation of SSP. That cryptosystem was broken by Shamir in [56], but
the interest persists and the ideas survive in numerous new cryptosystems and their variations
(see e.g. [47]). Generalizations of knapsack-type cryptosystems to non-commutative groups
seem quite promising from the viewpoint of post-quantum cryptography, although relevant
cryptographic schemes are yet to be built.
In [39], the authors showed, in particular, that SSP is NP-complete in: (1) the direct sum
of countably many copies of the infinite cyclic group Z; (2) free metabelian non-abelian
groups of finite rank; (3) wreath product of two finitely generated infinite abelian groups; (4)
Thompson’s group F; (5) Baumslag–Solitar group BS(m,n) for |m| 6= |n|, and in many other
groups.
In [27], the authors showed that the subset sum problem is polynomial time decidable in
every finitely generated virtually nilpotent group but there exists a polycyclic group where
this problem is NP-complete. Later in [46], Nikolaev and Ushakov showed that, in fact, every
polycyclic non-virtually-nilpotent group has NP-complete subset sum problem.
Also in [27], it was shown that the knapsack problem is undecidable in a direct product
of sufficiently many copies of the discrete Heisenberg group (which is nilpotent of class 2).
However, for the discrete Heisenberg group itself, the knapsack problem is decidable. Thus,
decidability of the knapsack problem is not preserved under direct products. In [12], the effect
of free and direct products on the time complexity of the knapsack and related problems was
studied further.
9. THE POST CORRESPONDENCE PROBLEM
The Post correspondence problem PCP(A) for a semigroup (or any other algebraic struc-
ture) A is to decide, given two n-tuples u = (u1, . . . ,un) and v = (v1, . . . ,vn) of elements
of A , if there is a term (called a solution) t(x1, . . . ,xn) in the language of A such that
t(u1, . . . ,un) = t(v1, . . . ,vn) in A . In 1946 Post introduced this problem in the case of free
monoids (free semigroups) and proved that it is undecidable [52]. (See [69] for a simpler
proof.)
The PCP in groups is closely related to the problem of finding the equalizer E(φ,ψ) of two
group homomorphisms φ,ψ :H→G. The equalizer is defined as E(φ,ψ) = {w ∈H | φ(w) =
ψ(w)}. Specifically, PCP in a group G is the same as to decide if the equalizer of a given pair
of homomorphisms φ,ψ ∈ Hom(H,G), where H is a free group of finite rank in the variety
Var(G) generated by G, is trivial or not. Indeed, in this case every tuple u = (u1, . . . ,un) of
elements of G corresponds to a homomorphism φu from a free group H with a basis x1, . . . ,xn
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in the variety Var(G) such that φu(x1)= u1, . . . ,φu(xn)= un. The equalizer E(φu,φv) describes
all solutions w for the instance (u,v).
There is an interesting variation of the Post correspondence problem for semigroups and
groups that we call a non-homogeneous Post correspondence problem, or a general Post
correspondence problem GPCP, following [40]: given two tuples u and v of elements in a
(semi)group S as above and two extra elements a,b ∈ S, decide if there is a term t(x1, . . . ,xn)
such that at(u1, . . . ,un) = bt(v1, . . . ,vn) in S. Interesting connections between GPCP and
the (double) twisted conjugacy problem were reported in [40]. Specifically, it was shown
in [40] that the double endomorphism twisted conjugacy problem in a relatively free group
in Var(G) is equivalent to GPCP(G), and, in general, the double endomorphism twisted
conjugacy problem in G is P-time reducible to GPCP(G).
Another interesting observation made in [40] is that ifGPCP is decidable in a groupG then
there is a uniform algorithm to solve the word problem in every finitely presented (relative to
G) quotient of G. Furthermore, since decidability ofGPCP in G is inherited by all subgroups
of G, decidability of GPCP in G implies the uniform decidability of the word problem in
every finitely presented quotient of every subgroup of G.
Examples of groups with undecidable GPCP include free groups and free solvable groups
of derived length at least 3 and sufficiently high rank ([40]). On the other hand, examples of
groups where GPCP is decidable in polynomial time include all finitely generated nilpotent
groups.
Furthermore, it was shown in [40] that in a free group, the bounded GPCP is NP-
complete. (In the bounded version of GPCP one is looking only for solutions (i.e., the words
t(x1, . . . ,xn)), whose length is bounded by a given number.)
The search version of the Post correspondence problem (or of the bounded version thereof)
is to find a solution for a given instance, provided at least one solution exists. As usual, search
versions can potentially be used to build cryptographic primitives, although it is not imme-
diately clear how to convert the search version of the (bounded or not) Post correspondence
problem to a one-way function with trapdoor.
10. THE HIDDEN SUBGROUP PROBLEM
Given a group G, a subgroup H ≤ G, and a set X , we say that a function f : G→ X hides
the subgroup H if for all g1,g2 ∈ G, one has f (g1) = f (g2) if and only if g1H = g2H for the
cosets of H . Equivalently, the function f is constant on the cosets of H , while it is different
between the different cosets of H .
The hidden subgroup problem (HSP) is:
Let G be a finite group, X a finite set, and f : G→ X a function that hides
a subgroup H ≤ G. The function f is given via an oracle, which uses
O(log |G|+ log |X |) bits. Using information gained from evaluations of f
via its oracle, determine a generating set for H .
A special case is where X is a group and f is a group homomorphism, in which case H
corresponds to the kernel of f .
The importance of the hidden subgroup problem is due to the facts that:
• Shor’s polynomial time quantum algorithm for factoring and discrete logarithm prob-
lem (as well as several of its extensions) relies on the ability of quantum computers
to solve the HSP for finite abelian groups. Both factoring and discrete logarithm
problem are of paramount importance for modern commercial cryptography.
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• The existence of efficient quantum algorithms for HSP for certain non-abelian groups
would imply efficient quantum algorithms for two major problems: the graph isomor-
phism problem and certain shortest vector problems in lattices. More specifically, an
efficient quantum algorithm for the HSP for the symmetric group would give a quan-
tum algorithm for the graph isomorphism, whereas an efficient quantum algorithm
for the HSP for the dihedral group would give a quantum algorithm for the shortest
vector problem.
We refer to [74] for a brief discussion on how the HSP can be generalized to infinite
groups.
11. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOME OF THE PROBLEMS
In this section, we discuss relations between some of the problems described earlier in this
survey. In the preceding Sections 8 and 9 we have already pointed out some of the relations,
now here are some other relations, through the prizm of cryptographic applications.
We start with the conjugacy search problem (CSP), which was the subject of Section 3,
and one of its ramifications, the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem:
Given two elements w,h of a group G, a subgroup A≤G, and the information
that wa = h for some a ∈ A, find at least one particular element a like that.
In reference to the Ko-Lee protocol described in Section 3, one of the parties (Alice)
transmits wa for some private a ∈ A, and the other party (Bob) transmits wb for some private
b∈ B, where the subgroups A and B commute elementwise, i.e., ab= ba for any a∈ A, b∈ B.
Now suppose the adversary finds a1,a2 ∈ A such that a1wa2 = a−1wa and b1,b2 ∈ B such
that b1wb2 = b
−1wb. Then the adversary gets
a1b1wb2a2 = a1b
−1wba2 = b−1a1wa2b= b−1a−1wab= K,
the shared secret key.
We emphasize that these a1,a2 and b1,b2 do not have anything to do with the private
elements originally selected by Alice or Bob, which simplifies the search substantially. We
also point out that, in fact, it is sufficient for the adversary to find just one pair, say, a1,a2 ∈ A,
to get the shared secret key:
a1(b
−1wb)a2 = b−1a1wa2b= b−1a−1wab= K.
In summary, to get the secret key K, the adversary does not have to solve the (subgroup-
restricted) conjugacy search problem, but instead, it is sufficient to solve an apparently easier
(subgroup-restricted) decomposition search problem, see our Section 4.
Then, one more trick reduces the decomposition search problem to a special case where
w = 1, i.e., to the factorization problem, see our Section 4.4. Namely, given w′ = a ·w · b,
multiply it on the left by the element w−1 (which is the inverse of the public element w) to
get
w′′ = w−1a ·w ·b= (w−1a ·w) ·b.
Thus, if we denote by Aw the subgroup conjugate to A by the (public) element w, the
problem for the adversary is now the following factorization search problem:
Given an element w′ of a group G and two subgroups Aw,B ≤ G, find any
two elements a ∈ Aw and b ∈ B that would satisfy a ·b= w′, provided at least
one such pair of elements exists.
Since in the original Ko-Lee protocol one has A = B, this yields the following interesting
observation: if in that protocol A is a normal subgroup of G, then Aw = A, and the above
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problem becomes: given w′ ∈ A, find any two elements a1,a2 ∈ A such that w′ = a1a2. This
problem is trivial: a1 here could be any element from A, and then a2 = a
−1
1 w
′.
Therefore, in choosing the platform group G and two commuting subgroups for a protocol
described in our Section 3 or Section 4, one has to avoid normal subgroups. This means,
in particular, that “artificially” introducing commuting subgroups as, say, direct factors is
inappropriate from the security point of view.
At the other extreme, there are malnormal subgroups. A subgroup A≤G is called malnor-
mal in G if, for any g ∈G, Ag∩A= {1}. We observe that if, in the original Ko-Lee protocol,
A is a malnormal subgroup of G, then the decomposition search problem corresponding to
that protocol has a unique solution if w /∈ A. Indeed, suppose w′ = a1 ·w · a′1 = a2 ·w · a′2,
where a1 6= a2, say. Then a−12 a1w = wa′2a′−11 , hence w−1a−12 a1w = a′2a′−11 . Since A is mal-
normal, the element on the left does not belong to A, whereas the one on the right does, a
contradiction. This argument shows that, in fact, already if Aw∩A = {1} for this particular
w, then the corresponding decomposition search problem has a unique solution.
Finally, we describe one more trick that reduces, to some extent, the decomposition search
problem to the (subgroup-restricted) conjugacy search problem. Suppose we are given w′ =
awb, and we need to recover a∈ A and b∈ B, where A and B are two elementwise commuting
subgroups of a group G.
Pick any b1 ∈ B and compute:
[awb,b1] = b
−1w−1a−1b−11 awbb1 = b
−1w−1b−11 wbb1 = (b
−1
1 )
wbb1 = ((b
−1
1 )
w)bb1.
Since we know b1, we can multiply the result by b
−1
1 on the right to get w
′′ = ((b−11 )
w)b.
Now the problem becomes: recover b ∈ B from the known w′′ = ((b−11 )w)b and (b−11 )w. This
is the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem. By solving it, one can recover a b ∈ B.
Similarly, to recover an a ∈ A, one picks any a1 ∈ A and computes:
[(awb)−1, (a1)−1] = awba1b−1w−1a−1a−11
= awa1w
−1a−1a−11 = (a1)
w−1a−1a−11 = ((a1)
w−1)a
−1
a−11 .
Multiply the result by a1 on the right to get w
′′ = ((a1)w
−1
)a
−1
, so that the problem be-
comes: recover a ∈ A from the known w′′ = ((a1)w−1)a−1 and (a1)w−1 .
We have to note that, since a solution of the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem
is not always unique, solving the above two instances of this problem may not necessarily give
the right solution of the original decomposition problem. However, any two solutions, call
them b′ and b′′, of the first conjugacy search problem differ by an element of the centralizer
of (b−11 )
w, and this centralizer is unlikely to have a non-trivial intersection with B.
A similar computation shows that the same trick reduces the factorization search problem,
too, to the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem. Suppose we are given w′ = ab,
and we need to recover a ∈ A and b ∈ B, where A and B are two elementwise commuting
subgroups of a group G. Pick any b1 ∈ B and compute
[ab,b1] = b
−1a−1b−11 abb1 = (b
−1
1 )
bb1.
Since we know b1, we can multiply the result by b
−1
1 on the right to get w
′′ = (b−11 )
b. This
is the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search problem. By solving it, one can recover a b ∈ B.
This same trick can, in fact, be used to attack the subgroup-restricted conjugacy search
problem itself. Suppose we are given w′ = a−1wa, and we need to recover a ∈ A. Pick any
b from the centralizer of A; typically, there is a public subgroup B that commutes with A
elementwise; then just pick any b ∈ B. Then compute
[w′,b] = [a−1wa,b] = a−1w−1ab−1a−1wab= a−1w−1b−1wab= (b−w)ab.
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Multiply the result by b−1 on the right to get (b−w)a, so the problem now is to recover
a ∈ A from (b−w)a and b−w. This problem might be easier than the original problem because
there is flexibility in choosing b∈B. In particular, a feasible attack might be to choose several
different b ∈ B and try to solve the above conjugacy search problem for each in parallel by
using some general method (e.g., a length-based attack). Chances are that the attack will be
successful for at least one of the b’s.
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